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INTRODUCTION: THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
I
By the end of the nineteenth century two tests had developed in the
criminal law of England and America to determine whether an offender
should be held criminally liable. The first of these, the so-called
M'Naghten rule, predicated responsibility on the offender's ability to
distinguish right and wrong, good from evil. The second test, often
called the "irresistible impulse" or "controlling impulses" test, relieved
the offender from criminal sanctions if his actions were caused by some
compelling force which he could not control.
During most of the nineteenth century, the District of Columbia
courts vacillated between the two tests. In 1818, a District of Colum-
bia court instructed a jury that if it found that the defendant was in
"such a state of mental insanity. . . as not to have been conscious of the
moral turpitude of the act," it should not find him guilty.1 In 1853,
however, at least one judge demonstrated that he was not opposed to
the controlling impulse concept by instructing the jury that:
In order to constitute a crime a person must have intelligence and ca-
pacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason
and mental powers are either so deficient that he has no will, no con-
science, or controlling mental power, or if through the overwhelming
violence of mental disease his intellectual power is for the time obliter-
ated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not punishable for
criminal acts. 2
But only a few sentences later in the same charge to the jury the judge
elaborated on criminal responsibility in the context of the right-wrong
test. Several years later, another court gave the instruction in a mur-
der trial that if the defendant was "laboring under some controlling dis-
ease, which was in truth the acting power within him which he could
not resist," he should be acquitted.'
Nevertheless, after United States v. Guiteau in 1882 there was no
doubt that the M'Naghten right-wrong test was applicable in the Dis-
1. United States v. Clarke, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 158 (1818).
2. United States v. Woodward, 7 D.C. (2 Haz. & Hay.) 119, 120 (1853).
3. United States v. Sickles, 7 D.C. (2 Haz. & Hay.) 319, 328 (1859).
4. 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498 (1882).
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trict of Columbia, although the status of the controlling impulse test
remained uncertain. The trial was an excellent forum for pronounc-
ing an insanity standard, since the defendant was the assassin of Presi-
dent Garfield. Guiteau, who believed that he had to murder the Presi-
dent to save the Republican Party and the country, relied heavily on
the theory that he suffered insane delusions at the time of the crime.
The trial judge instructed the jury that:
If he [Guiteau] is laboring under disease of his mental faculties-if
that is a proper expression-to such an extent that he does not know
what he is doing, or does not know that it is wrong, then he is wanting in
that sound memory and discretion which makes a part of the defini-
tion of murder. 5
Guiteau's defense counsel had requested an instruction on controlling
impulse,6 but the trial judge refused. The appellate court held that the
refusal had been proper, but only because no evidence had been intro-
duced on controlling impulse. The higher court specified.that it was
not ruling on whether the defense counsel's requested wording reflected
the law of the District of Columbia.7
Shortly after the Guiteau decision, the right-wrong test came under
severe attack. Much of the debate centered on the issue of whether
"knowing" wrong should be limited to cognition. An 1895 decision
went beyond a merely literal definition of "knowing":
Does the evidence prove or does it leave your minds in reasonable
doubt upon the question whether the defendant knew or responsi-
bly appreciated that it was wrong to kill a human being?8
Arguments were raised that the right-wrong test-whatever the defi-
nition of "knowledge"-dealt only with cognitive or intellectual im-
pairments and failed to recognize personality as an integrated whole.
Finally, in 1929, the Court of Appeals decided in Smith v. United
States9 that the irresistible impulse test also applied in the jurisdiction.
The court announced:
The mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is no longer the cor-
rect test either in civil or criminal cases, where the defense of insanity
5. Id. at 550.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Travers v. United States, 6 App. D.C. 450, 464 (1895) (emphasis added).
9. 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929). All references to "Court of Appeals" indicato
the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. This court is to be
distinguished from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (formerly Municipal
Court of Appeals).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/3
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is interposed. The accepted rule in this day and age. . . is that the ac-
cused must be capable, not only of distinguishing between right and
wrong, but that he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible im-
pulse, which means before it will justify a verdict of acquittal that his
reasoning powers were so far dethroned by his diseased mental condi-
tion as to deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to
perpetuate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong.10
The holding in Smith allowed trial judges to instruct juries in terms
of either a right-wrong test or at least some form of irresistible impulse.
Perhaps the Smith court was concerned only with literally impulsive,
spur-of-the-moment conduct, but such a limitation, if it ever existed,
was removed by the Court of Appeals in 1945 when it remarked that
a defendant is insane ". . . if his reason has ceased to have dominion
of his mind to such an extent that his will was controlled, not by ra-
tional thought, but by mental disease."" Such language apparently
allowed an insanity defense for an act compelled by the disease, although
not impulsive. A later case implied that Guiteau, Smith, and the lan-
guage just quoted represented three different tests, all applicable to
trials in the District of Columbia in which the insanity defense was
raised.' 2
Once an insanity defense was defined and established, the question
still remained whether it was the defendant or the state who had to
bear the burden of proof. As early as 1859 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court discussed this problem, stating that the insanity issue
was similar to any other question of fact in a criminal trial:
When evidence is adduced that a prisoner is insane, and conflicting
testimony makes a question for the jury, they are to decide it like any
other matter of fact; and if they should say or conclude that there is un-
certainty, that they cannot determine whether the defendant was or is
not so insane, as to protect him, how can they render a verdict that a
sane man perpetrated the crime and that no other can?' 3
Although the ultimate burden rested on the state to prove defend-
ant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant bore the initial
burden of producing evidence to show that he was insane. This result
arose from the age-old presumption of sanity in the criminal law. Con-
10. Id. at 549.
11. Halloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
12. Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
13. United States v. Sickles, 7 D.C. (2 Haz. & Hay.) 319, 327 (1859) (emphasis
added).
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ceivably, a defendant could introduce evidence on the insanity issue
which was so insubstantial that it failed to meet his initial burden. In
Tatum v. United States,14 however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals ruled that any evidence of insanity presented by the defendant
shifted the burden to the Government. Moreover, it was for the jury to
decide if the defendant's evidence raised a reasonable doubt of insanity.
Thus, if some evidence of insanity was introduced, the appropriate in-
struction should be given to the jury for it to decide if the evidence
required acquittal. 15 The judge's role was merely to determine if the
issue of insanity had been raised at all.
By 1954, the District of Columbia had an insanity defense clearly
based on a combination of the M'Naghten right-wrong test and the ir-
resistible impulse test. The court had also explicitly defined the bur-
den of proof question in relation to the insanity defense. Still, criti-
cism of the insanity tests continued and alternatives were suggested.
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia undertook a
re-evaluation of the entire body of law surrounding the insanity defense.
As a result of this evaluation, a new formulation of the insanity defense
was created.
II
The new insanity rule was announced in Durham v. United States.10
The defendant, Monte Durham, was convicted in the district court on
a charge of house-breaking, his only defense being insanity. On ap-
peal, two grounds for reversal were urged: The trial court erred in
applying the rules governing the burden of proof on the insanity de-
fense; and the existing tests of criminal responsibility were obsolete
and should be superseded.
Judge Bazelon, writing for the court, first considered the lower
court's application of existing law. The trial judge had held that since
the defendant introduced no evidence of insanity, the presumption of
sanity decided the issue against him. Judge Bazelon found that the
defendant's mother had recounted her son's nervous condition, and
more importantly, the only expert witnesss, a psychiatrist, had testified
that defendant could have been suffering from mental illness at the time
of the offense, although he was not positive. Relying chiefly on Ta-
14. 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
15. Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
16. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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tum, Judge Bazelon held that the evidence offered by the defendant was
sufficient to have placed the burden on the Government to prove his
sanity. Since the trial judge misapprehended the proper placing of the
burden of proof, the conviction was overturned.' 7
Nevertheless, the court did not rest its decision on the first error
alone. Judge Bazelon went on to consider the existing tests for insan-
ity in the District of Columbia. He first pointed out the many criticisms
of the right-wrong test raised since its adoption by the majority of Amer-
ican courts. The Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment 1949-1953 and the Preliminary Report by the Committee on
Forensic Psychiatry had concluded that the right-wrong test was "based
on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of
insanity.' ' s By using the right-wrong test, the court and jury were
forced to look at only the cognitive element in the human personality,
which is "scientifically speaking, inadequate, and most often, invalid
and irrelevant testimony in determining criminal responsibility."' 9
Judge Bazelon argued, however, that the most fundamental objection
to the right-wrong test was not so much that it forced the jury to
look at the cognitive element alone, but that it forced them to look at
any one particular element or symptom of human personality. "In
this field of law as in others, the fact finder should be free to con-
sider all information advanced by relevant scientific disciplines."2
Moreover, the adoption of the "irresistible impulse" test did little to
broaden the inquiry into a defendant's mental state. Unfortunately,
this test carried the implication that mental disease produces "only
sudden, momentary or spontaneous inclinations to commit unlawful
acts."''  As the Royal Commission Report pointed out, insane behavior
is not necessarily impulsive. Such long term illnesses as melancholia or
paranoia can so grip an individual that he is forced to commit irrational
or criminal acts.
In concluding his review of the arguments against the right-wrong
and irresistible impulse tests, Judge Bazelon summarized the main
points as follows:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is inadequate
in that (a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic realities and
17. Id. at 869.
18. Id. at 871.
19. Id. at 872.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 873.
Vol. 1973:191
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scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one symptom and so can-
not validly be applied in all circumstances. We find that the "irresisti-
ble impulse" test is also inadequate in that it gives no recognition to
mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection and so relegates
acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-
wrong test. We conclude that a broader test should be adopted.22
The new test to be applied in the District of Columbia was that an
"accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect. '23 The word "disease"
was defined in the sense of a "condition which is capable of either im-
proving or deteriorating"; 24 "defect" as a "condition which is not con-
sidered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be
either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physi-
cal or mental disease. ' 25  "Product," although left largely undefined,
was expected to convey a sense of causal connection. 26
In order to aid courts in future cases, Judge Bazelon attempted to
give a sample instruction to the jury:
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was
not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time
he committed the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If
you believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condi-
tion when he committed the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the act was not the product of such mental abnormality, you may
find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt either
that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition,
or that the act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find
the accused not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus your task would not
be completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered
from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for his
unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental ab-
normality and the act. These questions must be determined by you
from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony
and the evidence in this case. 27
Concluding his opinion, Judge Bazelon explored the benefits which
the new rule might be expected to produce. The psychiatrists would
22. Id. at 874.
23. Id. at 875.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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hopefully be enabled to give a complete picture of the defendant for
the jury to evaluate. Moreover, on the ultimate factual issue of in-
sanity, the jury would not be limited to a consideration of isolated
symptoms or elements of the defendant's personality, but could ex-
plore all relevant evidence. Judge Bazelon conceded that the ques-
tions of fact under the Durham rule might be difficult for the jury,
but he felt that these questions should be no more difficult than the
medical questions involved in total disability claims under insurance
policies. Finally, Judge Bazelon believed that under the new insanity
rule, the jury would continue to perform its traditional function, the
application of "our inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals
prosecuted for crime. "2$ Under the new rule, however, "they will
be guided by wider horizons of knowledge concerning mental life."'29
III
It is hardly surprising, considering the novelty of the Durham insan-
ity rule, that many cases following the Court of Appeals decision in
1954 were involved in explaining and interpreting the rule. The
early cases after Durham fall into three basic patterns: 1) those
dealing with key definitions in the rule such as "mental disease" and
"mental defect"; 2) those dealing with the burden of proof and the at-
tendant problem of the role of expert testimony; and 3) those dealing
with procedural matters surrounding the rule.
The Court of Appeals was faced very early with the problem of de-
termining what constituted a "mental disease." In Stewart v. United
States"' at least some of the psychiatric testimony concluded that the
defendant was suffering from a "psychopathic personality." This
condition was not considered to be serious enough to justify its inclu-
sion in the categories of psychoses or neuroses. In instructing the jury,
the trial judge emphasized that a psychopathic personality was usually
considered a "disorder," and as such would not usually be defined as
a "disease," which implies some sort of physiological condition. The
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction. It held that the
trial judge had misconstrued the insanity rule. It is for the jury to
decide whether a psychopathic disorder constituted a "mental disease"
within the meaning of the Durham rule. In subsequent cases, the
28. Id. at 876.
29, Id.
30. 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Vol. 1973:19]
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court reviewed criminal convictions involving sociopaths,"1 pyroman-
iacs, 32 epileptics,33 and mental retardates.34  The court held consist-
ently that these disorders constituted "some evidence" of mental illness,
and as such were sufficient to raise a jury question whether the particu-
lar disorder came under the Durham rule as a "mental disease" or
"defect."
Still another vexing problem for the District of Columbia courts was
the meaning of "product." Trial courts had experienced some dif-
ficulty in instructing the jury that in order to find a defendant not
guilty, his act must be the "product" of a mental disease or defect. In
Carter v. United States,35 the Court of Appeals attempted to clarify
the "product" concept:
When we say the defense of insanity requires that the act be a "product
of" a disease, we do not mean that it must be a direct emission, or a
proximate creation, or an immediate issue of the disease. . . we mean
that the facts on the record are such that the trier of the facts is enabled
to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not have com-
mitted the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was.
There must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that
relationship, whatever it may be in degree, must be, as we have already
said, critical in its effect in respect to the act. By "critical" we mean de-
cisive, determinative, causal; we mean to convey the idea inherent in
the phrases "because of", "except for", "without which", "but for", "ef-
feet of", "result of", "causative factor"; the disease made the effective
or decisive difference between doing and not doing the act. The short
phrases "product of" and "causal connection" are not intended to be
precise, as though they were chemical formulae. They mean that the
facts concerning the disease and the facts concerning the act are such
as to justify reasonably the conclusion that "but for this disease the act
would not have been committed."36
In addition to definitional problems connected with the Durham
rule, the court also sought to explain the role of expert testimony and
its effect on the burden of proof in the insanity issue. The court was
consistently liberal in accepting psychiatric testimony of character dis-
orders as constituting "some evidence" of mental disease or defect
31. United States v. Blocker, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
32. Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
33. Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
34. Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
35. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
36. Id. at 617.
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sufficient to raise a jury question and place the burden of proof on
the Government to prove defendant's sanity at the time of the crime.
A more acute problem confronted the Court of Appeals in a series of
cases in which the defendant contended that he should have been
granted a directed verdict on the basis of expert testimony.
In Douglas v. United States,3 7 a robbery case, both lay and expert
witnesses testified to defendant's bizarre and violent personality his-
tory. Psychiatrists testified that defendant was a paranoid schizo-
phrenic, and one stated, in response to the question of whether de-
fendant's acts were a product of his disease, that ". . . from the symp-
toms present I would think there was a very definite causal relation."3
The Court of Appeals reversed a finding of guilty by the trial court,
stating that a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
should have been entered because, with the testimony of the psychia-
trists, reasonable doubt existed as to defendant's sanity. The prose-
cution, by utilizing only lay testimony on its behalf, did not meet its
burden of proof. A similar case was Blunt v. United States,39 another
robbery case. Two psychiatrists testified that defendant had been suf-
fering from dementia praecox on the date of the robbery, and a third
said the defendant was definitely psychotic but could offer no opinion
as to the duration of the mental illness. The Government offered only
the testimony of the victims that the defendant appeared rational
and lucid to them. Again, the Court of Appeals overturned the con-
viction, stating that the Government had not met its burden of proof.
Although not consistently uniform,"0 the Court of Appeals showed a
strong tendency to require directed verdicts in those cases where ex-
pert witnesses had testified that defendant was suffering from a mental
disease. In Wright v. United States,41 eleven psychiatrists testified
that the defendant was a schizophrenic. Five of them stated that at
the time of the offense (murder) he was suffering from this condi-
tion. Four of the psychiatrists testified, with varying degrees of posi-
tiveness, that defendant's acts were caused by his mental condition. The
only government evidence was testimony by the arresting officers. In
overturning a conviction of guilty, the Court of Appeals said: "To send
37. 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
38. Id. at 56.
39. 244 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
40, See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
41. 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Vol. 1973:191
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the case to the jury in face of so strong a showing of insanity requires
more than minimal evidence of sanity."42
Even though the court seemed to be relying heavily on psychia-
tric testimony in the cases immediately following Durham, they were
not entirely satisfied with the performance of psychiatrists on the wit-
ness stand. The court felt that psychiatrists often testified in conclu-
sory terms, flatly declaring that the defendant was suffering from "men-
tal illness" or that his acts were the "product" of such an illness. Even
where the psychiatrist attempted a more elaborate explanation, his
testimony was often useless because the jury could not be expected
to understand unexplained medical labels such as "schizophrenic," and
"paranoia."
In Taylor v. United States,43 the court considered the natural curi-
osity of the jury about the consequences of an acquittal by reason
of insanity. The defendant had requested that he be allowed to in-
form the jury that an acquittal by insanity did not result in immediate
freedom for the defendant. The court, possibly in response to popular
criticism that the Dprham rule was allowing madmen to roam the streets,
promulgated the following rule: "[W]hen an accused person has
pleaded insanity, counsel may and the judge should inform the jury that
if he is acquitted by reason of insanity he will be presumed to be insane
and may be confined in a 'hospital for the insane' as long as 'the pub-
liec safety and ... [his] welfare' require."44  This instruction was la-
ter made mandatory in all insanity cases unless the defendant requested
otherwise.45
IV
By 1961, the experience of the District of Columbia courts with the
Durham rule had resulted in some disenchantment. Judge Burger, now
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in a lengthy dissent
in Blocker v. United States,46 called for a complete re-examination of the
insanity defense in the District of Columbia. The chief difficulty with
the Durham rule, according to him, was the vagueness of the terms
"mental disease" and "product." Citing United States v. Blocker47 as
42. Id. at 9.
43. 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
44. Id. at 404.
45. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
46. 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
47. 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
['Vol. 1973:19
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an example of the anomalous results created by these terms, he noted
that in that case the court had accepted a change in terminology by
the psychiatric staff of St. Elizabeths Hospital which resulted in "socio-
pathy" being classified as a "mental disease." As a result of this change
in terminology, which was done only for administrative convenience,
Blocker's conviction had been overturned. Judge Burger also felt
that "product" used in the sense of causation was a fallacy, and that it
was impossible to prove that any mental illness "caused" a specific crimi-
nal act. Moreover, he complained that the concentration on these two
terms in the psychiatric testimony allowed the psychiatrists to usurp the
jury's functions by testifying on ultimate conclusions. On a more philo-
sophical plane, Judge Burger declared that the Durham rule had aban-
doned the concept of "freedom of will," which he stated to be a funda-
mental tenet of the criminal law and, indeed, of an ordered, stable
society. He felt that the Durham rule had made "determinists" of
the Court of Appeals and that the court had rejected the ethical and
moral obligations which form a cornerstone of the criminal law.
Further evidence of the deepening split on the Court of Appeals over
the meaning of the Durham rule was given in Campbell v. United
States.s The trial judge had given an instruction to the jury based on
the "right-wrong" and "irresistible impulse" tests as well as the Durham
test. While not denying that the earlier tests could be used as supple-
mentary tests, the majority on the Court of Appeals found that the lower
court's charge left the impression that the "right-wrong" and "irresis-
tible impulse" tests were the sole criteria by which the jury should judge
defendant's insanity. In particular, they emphasized that the "but-for"
requirement of the product element of the Durham rule should not be
presented to the jury as referring to the defendant's capacity to con-
trol his behavior. The "but-for" or "product" element of Durham
should be used in a "deterministic sense."49
Judge Burger, in a vigorous dissent, denied that the "product" part
of the Durham rule was to be taken as an espousal of determinism.
He stated that a "mental disease can be thought to 'produce' a crim-
inal act only if it affects the defendant's understanding or his power
to control his acts." 0 He found that the majority's opinion would lead
inexorably in a "deterministic" direction and would overthrow the
48 307 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
49. Id. at 602.
50, Id. at 604.
Vol. 1973:19]
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"moral responsibility so necessary to the criminal law." 1  As an an-
tidote to the court's current unhealthy trend, Judge Burger recom-
mended a return to Justice Cardozo's concept of a "common sense
which assumes the freedom of the will."'5 2
In concluding his dissent, Judge Burger reiterated his complaint in
earlier dissents that expert psychiatric witnesses were usurping the
jury's function. By testifying whether or not a defendant had a "mental
disease," and whether or not defendant's action was a "product" of that
disease, they were essentially deciding the ultimate issue of criminal
responsibility. Moreover, this consequence of the Durham rule tended
to narrow a psychiatrist's testimony to simple conclusions about mental
disease and product. Judge Burger remarked that this was just the op-
posite effect from that which the court had hoped to achieve by in-
troducing the Durham rule to replace the M'Naghten and "irresis-
tible impulse" rules.
The majority on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expli-
citly recognized the validity of some of Judge Burger's criticisms in a
1962 case, McDonald v. United States."3 Judge Bazelon, writing for
the majority, noted the vagueness of "mental disease" and "defect"
and the unfortunate effect this vagueness had produced on the opera-
tion of the Durham rule:
Our eight-year experience under Durham suggests a judicial definition,
however broad and general, of what is included in the terms "disease"
and "defect". In Durham, rather than define either term we simply
sought to distinguish disease from defect. Our purpose now is to make
it very clear that neither the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc defi-
nitions or conclusions as to what experts state is a "disease or defect".
What psychiatrists may consider a "mental disease or defect" for clin-
ical purposes, where their concern is treatment, may or may not be the
same as mental disease or defect for the jury's purpose in determining
criminal responsibility. Consequently, for that purpose the jury should
be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal con-
dition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional proc-
esses and substantially impairs behavior controls. Thus the jury would
consider testimony concerning the development, adaptation and func-
tioning of these processes and controls.54
51. Id. at 611.
52. Id. at 609, citing Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937).
53. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
54. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/3
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The Court of Appeals emphasized the ultimate authority of the jury on
the insanity issue in McDonald and in a subsequent case, Hawkins v.
United States.55 In both cases the defendant urged a reversal of his
conviction on the grounds that he should have been granted a directed
verdict by the trial court. Psychiatrists had testified that both defend-
ants were suffering from some sort of character disorder which could be
considered a "mental disease." The Government offered no rebuttal
evidence on defendant's sanity. The Court of Appeals refused to over-
turn the convictions, holding that the jury was not bound to accept
the psychiatrist's determination of "mental disease." The court thus
seemed to indicate, contrary to its earlier holdings, that a directed ver-
dict in an insanity trial would be justified only in extremely rare cir-
cumstances.
The decision in McDonald did not completely heal the split on the
Court of Appeals concerning the Durham rule. In Gray v. United
States 6 Judge Bazelon and Judge Burger engaged in a spirited dis-
cussion of "free will" and its relation to the McDonald-Durham in-
sanity defense. More importantly, perhaps, the decision in McDonald
did not end the dissatisfaction of the judges with expert psychiatric
testimony presented at insanity trials. Judge Bazelon, in a series of
concurrences and dissents,57 continually emphasized the inadequacy of
the psychiatrists' testimony and their medical examinations of defend-
ants. Echoing Judge Burger in earlier dissents, he attacked the con-
tinuing use of conclusory testimony dwelling on the terms "mental di-
sease" and "product." He also expressed his disapproval of the cur-
sory investigation into the background and childhood of the defendants,
most of whom were indigents. Judge Bazelon particularly criticized
the calm acceptance of "boilerplate" routine reports from government
psychiatrists both at competency hearings and at trial. Again and again
he stressed that the Durham rule was intended to allow complete inves-
tigations into a defendant's case history and background. Sketchy and
hastily written psychiatric reports had done little or nothing to aid
juries in their determinations.
Finally, in Washington v. United States58 the court made perhaps
55. 310 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
56. 319 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
57. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Jackson v.
United States, 336 F.2d 579, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Simpson v. United States, 320
F.2d 803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
58. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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the most significant departure from the Durham rule. Judge Bazelon,
writing for the majority, found that the performance of the psychia-
trists at the instant trial had been wholly unsatisfactory. He felt that
the testimony given, which included no case histories or discussion of
psychiatric tests, was "conclusory" and uninformative to the jury. Re-
viewing the past difficulties under Durham, he noted that McDonald had
attempted to provide a legal definition of "mental disease" in order to:
clearly separate the legal and moral question of culpability from the
medical-clinical concept of illness. We hoped thereby to separate the
roles of the psychiatrist and jury, with the former stating medical-
clinical facts and opinions and the latter making the judgments re-
quired by the legal and moral standard.5 9
After examining transcripts of the many insanity cases decided since
Durham, however, Judge Bazelon concluded that conclusory labels had
too often been substituted for the facts and analysis which underlay them.
In effect, the result was often to take away the jury's function and
transfer it to the psychiatrist. This, Judge Bazelon felt, was a usur-
pation of the society's decision to give a lay body the ultimate author-
ity for deciding criminal responsibility.
In order to alleviate these difficulties, the court held that in the future
psychiatrists were not to be allowed to testify whether defendant's ac-
tion was a "product" of his mental condition. Although "mental di-
sease" was allowed since it also had medical significance, the use of
any medical or scientific labels was to be discouraged. If such terms
seemed absolutely necessary, the testifying psychiatrist would be required
to give a complete and practical explanation to the jury. The essence of
desirable expert testimony was described as "the kind of opinion you
would give to a family which brought one of its members to your clinic
and asked for your diagnosis of his mental condition and a description
of how his condition would be likely to influence his conduct."0
Beginning in 1967, the Court of Appeals decided a series of cases
dealing with the relationship between alcoholism, narcotics addiction
and the McDonald-Durham rule. In Gaskins v. United States,0 1 the
court laid down the rule that narcotics addiction alone does not justify
a finding of "mental disease" within the scope of the insanity defense.
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 458. The question of whether expert witnesses could testify as to a
"causal relationship" between the mental disease and the act was never squarely de-
cided. See Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
61. 410 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/3
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Addiction may be considered with other evidence in deciding whether
a defendant was suffering from a "mental disease" and the jury should
be so instructed. A later case, Salzman v. United States,62 confirmed
the same rule in cases of chronic alcoholism. Although urged to recon-
sider the entire insanity defense and its relation to narcotics addiction
in Watson v. United States,"3 the court declined to review Durham and
reiterated its earlier holdings.
In United States v. Eichberg,64 a recent case to reach the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia concerning the insanity defense,
the court was requested to overturn a conviction of forgery because the
Government had failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court refused to grant a motion of acquittal. In a very short
per curiam opinion, the majority, citing previous cases, confirmed the
lower court, holding that the question of responsibility presented
a "classic" question for the jury.
Chief Judge Bazelon, in a concurring opinion, raised some questions
regarding the proper function of the appellate courts in reviewing jury de-
cisions on criminal responsibility. He noted that since McDonald, the
court had been extremely reluctant to overturn the jury's finding of
criminal responsibility, even in cases in which the Government had car-
ried its burden of proof only by relying on the patent weakness of the
evidence presented by the defendant. He doubted the validity of a rule
holding the Government to a high standard of proving criminal re-
sponsibility if the appellate courts were powerless to check the jury.
Explaining this somewhat curious position, Chief Judge Bazelon
pointed out the special nature of the jury's role in deciding issues of
criminal responsibility in insanity cases. He noted that first, the jury
had to decide a question of fact; it measured "the extent to which the de-
fendant's mental and emotional processes and behavior controls were
impaired at the time of the unlawful act."'65  On this question, the
jury had to take all facts into consideration and come to a decision
on those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Bazelon felt that
the jury's second function was to "evaluate that impairment (i.e. the
defendant's) in light of community standards of blameworthiness, to
determine whether the defendant's impairment makes it unjust to hold
62 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64, 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
65, Id. at 624.
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him responsible." 66 It was disturbing to Judge Bazelon, however, that
the court regularly placed this burden of deciding the second question,
i.e. "blameworthiness," on the jury without giving it clear instruc-
tions pointing out this special function. He recommended telling the
jurors that they were "measuring mental disability in terms of commun-
ity concepts of blameworthiness. '67  The minority report of the
ALI-Model Penal Code Commission also adopted this approach:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect his capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be
held responsible.68
Although Judge Bazelon realized that many commentators disliked
presenting questions of justice to the jury, he considered it wrong to
disguise this jury function in the form of a pseudo-factual or medical
test.
Chief Judge Bazelon concluded his concurrence in Eichberg by
summarizing the difficulties that had been encountered with the Mc-
Donald-Durham rule. Psychiatric testimony had too often been con-
clusory, and had centered around whether the defendant was suffer-
ing from "mental disease" or whether his act was the "product" of
the disease. Hearkening back to an earlier comment in Washington
Chief Judge Bazelon noted that it might be more sensible to "make
the ultimate test whether or not it is just to blame the defendant for
his act. If the question was simply whether it is 'just' to blame the de-
fendant, then mental illness, productivity, ability to control oneself, etc.,
might be factors which the jury could consider in reaching its con-
clusion on the justness of punishment."69 Judge Bazelon felt, however,
that since the court would shortly be reconsidering the test of criminal
responsibility in United States v. Brawner,70 he was content to join the
majority in confirming the lower court opinion in the present case.
V
The facts of Brawner were largely uncontested and can be very sim-
66. Id. at 625.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 452 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cited
in United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 627 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
70. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/3
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ply stated. Archie Brawner had spent the morning and afternoon of
September 8, 1967, drinking wine. Together with his uncle, he went
that evening to a party at the home of three acquaintances. About
10:30 a fight broke out, and Brawner was injured. After leaving the
party, Brawner secured a gun and returned to the site of the party.
He fired five shots through the closed metal door to the apartment; two
of the shots struck Billy Ford, killing him. Brawner was arrested
shortly thereafter.
Brawner was convicted of murder in the second degree. At the trial,
four psychiatrists and psychologists on the staff of St. Elizabeths Hos-
pital testified as expert witnesses, two testifying for the prosecution
and two for the defense. All four experts testified that defendant was
suffering from a mental disease, variously described as an "epi-
leptic personality disorder," "psychologic brain syndrome associated
with a convulsive disorder," "personality disorder associated with ep-
ilepsy," or "explosive personality. '' 71 The experts disagreed, however,
on the part which defendant's mental disease played in the killing. The
two witnesses for the defense testified that the defendant's act was a
product of his mental disease; the two government witnesses, on the
other hand, testified that it was not.
On appeal, counsel for the defense argued two grounds for overturn-
ing the verdict: 1) the trial court should not have permitted a prosecu-
tion expert witness to testify whether there was a "causal relation-
ship" between the defendant's mental disease and the act of killing;
and 2) the prosecutor in his summation went beyond permissible limits
in attempting to discredit certain psychological projective tests admin-
istered to the defendant at St. Elizabeths. After the case was argued to
a division of the Court of Appeals, the court sua sponte ordered re-
hearing en banc. Briefs amici curiae were solicited by the court
on the question of the appropriate standard for the insanity defense in
the District of Columbia. Briefs were received from Mr. William H.
Dempsey, Jr. (appointed as amicus curiae by the court); The Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union Fund of the National Capital Area; the Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Association; the National District At-
torneys Association; the Georgetown Legal Intern Project; the American
Psychiatric Association; the American Psychological Association; the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia; and Mr. David L. Cham-
bers, HI.
71. Id. at 975.
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On June 23, 1972, the Court of Appeals handed down its deci-
sion in the Brawner case. The court announced that it had decided to
abandon the insanity defense formulated in Durham eighteen years be-
fore. Replacing Durham in all future cases would be the formulation
devised by the American Law Institute (ALI) and already adopted
by the majority of the federal circuits: "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental di-
sease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law."'7 2 The court retained, however, the definition of "mental dis-
ease or defect" adopted in McDonald: "A mental disease or de-
fect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially affects behavior
controls.
'7 3
In addition to the reformulation of the insanity defense for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Court of Appeals also discussed several corollary
issues. The court mentioned, but did not decide, the constitutionality
of the 1970 amendment to the District of Columbia Code, which
apparently shifted the burden of proof on the insanity issue to the de-
fendant. 74  The court affirmed its previous ruling in Lyles v. United
States"5 that the jury should be instructed on the effect of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity.73  Most importantly, perhaps, the
court reversed its earlier position and stated that, in the future, expert
testimony as to a defendant's abnormal mental condition could be con-
sidered in deciding whether a defendant had the specific mental state
required for a particular crime or degree of crime.
In disposing of the case at hand, the Court of Appeals rejected both
grounds of error proffered by the defendant's counsel. The court found
that testimony on the "causal relationship" between defendant's mental
state and his act was not so prejudicial as to amount to reversible er-
ror. Again, although the court reproved the prosecution for its "over-
zealous" attempt to discredit projective psychological tests, it held that
the defendant had not been unduly prejudiced. However, the court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a new
72. Id. at 973.
73. Id. at 983.
74. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1970).
75. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
76. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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trial would be appropriate in light of the change in the formulation of
the insanity defense.
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon accepted the
replacement of the Durham rule by the ALI formulation. To him, how-
ever, the principal issue was whether the adoption of the ALI formu-
lation would be responsive to the difficulties encountered under Dur-
ham. The first difficulty, a definition of "mental disease or defect"
which would lessen the dominance of expert testimony, Judge Bazelon
felt had not been overcome, since the majority retained the existing
definition. A second difficulty, the problem of "productivity," had
been ameliorated by discarding this term from the insanity defense
formulation. Judge Bazelon noted, however, that the ALI formula-
tion also contains a strong, if not so apparent, element of causality.
Finally, the practical difficulties surrounding indigent defendants who
must depend on charity for legal and psychiatric assistance had not
been touched upon by the new formulation of the insanity defense. Judge
Bazelon would have preferred an insanity formulation along the lines
of the Royal Commission Report: a defendant is not responsible "if at
the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or
behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly
be held responsible for his act."7  However, Judge Bazelon's con-
cern was not centered so much on the exact formula used to express
the insanity defense as on the immediate and practical problems pre-
sented by criminal administration of the insanity defense. He feared
that it might be said of Brawner, as it was of Durham, that "while
the generals are designing an inspiring new insignia for the standard,
the battle is being lost in the trenches.17 8
77. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78. Id. at 1012.
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